Duolingo English Test Interactive Speaking Practice #12 — Hard Level

that question cuts to the center of · my tentative position is · my main reason is · I hold this view with genuine uncertainty

That question cuts to the center of metaethics, and I want to be honest about the difficulty rather than giving you a clean answer I don't actually hold with confidence. My tentative position is a form of what philosophers sometimes call moral realism — the view that at least some moral claims are objectively true. My main reason is that without something like objectivity, it becomes very hard to explain why we regard moral progress as real rather than merely as change. When we say that the abolition of slavery represented a moral advance rather than simply a different social arrangement, we seem to be committed to the idea that the earlier practice was actually wrong, not just unpopular in retrospect. But I hold this view with genuine uncertainty, because the arguments for constructivism — the view that values are built rather than discovered — are also serious ones that I haven't fully resolved to my own satisfaction.

that's the sharpest objection to · you're right that · but I think there's a distinction between · I'm reluctant to say that

That's the sharpest objection to the position I just sketched, and I want to take it seriously rather than deflecting it. You're right that the narrative of moral progress has often been articulated by people in positions of power and has been used to justify cultural imperialism — the idea that certain societies were more 'advanced' and therefore entitled to impose their values on others. That history is real and it matters. But I think there's a distinction between the misuse of the concept of progress and the concept itself. When the enslaved people who were told that their condition was natural or ordained resisted and argued for their own freedom, they were appealing to something — a claim about their dignity and equal moral status — that they believed was not just culturally preferred but actually true. I'm reluctant to say that their conviction was merely a perspective among perspectives, because that would seem to equate their moral claim with the claims of those who defended the institution against them.

I think procedural justice is necessary but not sufficient · here's why · this is the insight behind · my view is that justice requires both

I think procedural justice — fair processes, applied consistently and without discrimination — is a necessary condition for justice but not a sufficient one. Here's why: a procedure can be formally fair and still produce outcomes that compound existing disadvantages in ways that are not themselves morally acceptable. If we start from deeply unequal positions, identical treatment may simply reproduce and entrench that inequality. This is the insight behind what Rawls called the difference principle — the idea that inequalities can only be justified if they work to the greatest advantage of the least well-off members of society. But I'm also wary of outcome-focused justice that overrides procedural constraints entirely, because procedure protects against the concentration of discretionary power in ways that pure outcome-tracking does not. My view is that justice requires both: fair procedures that do not systematically disadvantage particular groups, and attention to the cumulative outcomes those procedures produce over time.

the relationship is more dialectical than · Rawls described reflective equilibrium as · my practical approach is this · the difficulty is that distinguishing between those two cases

I think the relationship between moral intuitions and arguments is more dialectical than a simple hierarchy would suggest, and this is actually one of the places where I find myself most uncertain. The philosopher John Rawls described a method called reflective equilibrium — the idea that we work back and forth between our intuitions about particular cases and the principles we're prepared to accept, revising each in light of the other until we reach something like coherence. I find that description phenomenologically accurate, but it leaves open the question of which direction to revise when they can't both be retained. My practical approach is this: if an argument leads to a conclusion that strikes virtually everyone — not just me — as monstrous, I take that near-universal intuitive recoil as evidence that something has gone wrong in a premise rather than that we should accept the monstrous conclusion. But if an argument reveals that an intuition stems from bias, limited perspective, or mere unfamiliarity, then revising the intuition is the right move. The difficulty is that distinguishing between those two cases is itself a judgment call.

this question makes me genuinely uncomfortable · I think the honest answer is · what follows from this is not paralysis but · the goal isn't moral heroism

This question makes me genuinely uncomfortable, which I take as a sign that it's an important one. I think the honest answer is that some degree of complicity in morally problematic structures is unavoidable for most people living within contemporary societies, and that acknowledging this is more intellectually honest than claiming one has found a path to clean hands. The clothes I wear, the devices I use, the economic system that provides my income — all of these are embedded in structures that have identifiable moral costs, including labor exploitation and environmental damage that I have not consented to and do not endorse but from which I nonetheless benefit. I think what follows from this is not paralysis or cynicism but rather an orientation: to take seriously the cumulative effects of the choices that are genuinely within my control, to support structural changes that reduce systemic harm, and to resist the psychological mechanism whereby acknowledging that perfect purity is impossible becomes a license to stop trying. The goal isn't moral heroism; it's sustained moral seriousness within real constraints.

I'd say that Rawls has had the most sustained influence · I find this device compelling because · the veil of ignorance doesn't eliminate self-interest but · where I find Rawls less satisfying is

I'd say that John Rawls has had the most sustained influence on how I think about political ethics and justice, particularly through the idea of the original position — the thought experiment in which you reason about principles of social organization without knowing which position in society you would occupy. I find this device compelling because it operationalizes a moral insight I find deeply important: that principles of justice shouldn't be ones that you'd only endorse if you knew they'd benefit you specifically. The veil of ignorance doesn't eliminate self-interest; it redirects it toward asking what arrangements would be acceptable from any position, which seems to me like a genuine advance in making impartiality operational rather than merely aspirational. Where I find Rawls less satisfying is in his relatively limited engagement with global justice and with duties to non-human beings and future generations — domains where I think his framework needs significant extension rather than simple application. But as a starting point for thinking about what political institutions owe to the people who live under them, I find his work indispensable.